Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman receiving Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in Jeddah the 30th of July 2017. Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court /via Reuters
Saudi Arabia has gone on the offensive in Iraq. On April 4, the kingdom reopened its consulate in Baghdad, pledged $1.5 billion in aid and announced that it will soon open a consulate in Najaf. Behind these actions is a thinly veiled goal: countering Iran's influence and bringing Iraq back into the Arab fold. The new strategy appears to be creating an opening. Just a few days after visiting Tehran, last week Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi made an official visit to Riyadh, where he was received by King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS).
At the moment, post-Islamic State (IS) Iraq is relatively removed from regional power struggles and striving to position itself as an actor capable of talking to all parties. At the same time, it is also a theater for competition between the two external powers that wield in the most influence in the country: the United States and Iran. During the fight against IS, the central role played by Shiite militias affiliated with Iran increased the country’s influence. Now, Saudi Arabia seems to consider Iraq as fertile ground to counter Iran, and the Shiite forces in power in Baghdad are divided over what their relationship should be with Tehran.
The reopening of the consulate in Baghdad comes three years after Saudi Arabia reopened its embassy in the city, and Saudi is planning to open another consulate in Najaf, the heart of Iraqi Shi’ism, in the coming months. The kingdom also committed to opening other diplomatic missions in the country, including in Basra, a major oil city in the southeast.
These diplomatic developments were decided a few days after Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr visited Saudi Arabia in August 2017. During the trip, al-Sadr met with MBS, opening a new chapter in the relationship between Baghdad and Riyadh.
“The US pressed King Salman and MBS very hard in 2017 to begin a diplomatic track in Iraq. The Saudis and the Emiratis grew to like the idea, recognizing at the highest levels that it was important not to cede Iraq to Iran,” Michael Knights, an Iraq expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told L'Orient-Le Jour (OLJ).
“For the Saudis, what matters is to tear Iraq out of Iran's hands, not by directly threatening Baghdad, but by showing them the advantages of a relationship with them instead of Iran, especially economically and diplomatically,” an anonymous source within an international organization based in Iraq, told OLJ.
The Wahhabi kingdom would rather show its Arab neighbor all the benefits of cooperation, including more flexibility vis-a-vis Iraqi Shiites, such as facilitating their pilgrimage to Mecca, explains this source.
“Sistani has no reason to refuse”
Southern Iraq is predominantly Shiite, but is not entirely hostile territory for Saudi Arabia. As it makes inroads, the kingdom is counting on its relationship with al-Sadr, the Shiite leader in Iraq least aligned with Tehran, whose influence has greatly increased since his victory in May 2018’s legislative elections. Ayatollah Ali Sistani, one of the highest religious authorities in the Shi’ite world, whose stronghold is in Najaf, has criticized the way Shiites are treated in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. But he is unlikely to object to Saudi building a consulate on his turf.
“Ali Sistani has no reason to refuse the opening of the Najaf consulate because it will first and foremost serve Shiite religious students and people wishing to make their pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia,” the anonymous source said, adding: “The Najaf consulate will be particularly important socially and economically compared to the one in Baghdad, located in the inaccessible ‘green zone.’”
“I’m sure Iraq will accept the consulate, and actors like Moqtada al-Sadr will guarantee its security. Sistani tends to address his statements to all Iraqis and he avoids a sectarian prism,” Knights confirmed. “A lot of Saudi and Bahraini Shia follow Najaf and Sistani, and he is critical of KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and Bahrain. But it’s an interesting opening that KSA is offering.”
Najaf houses the mausoleum of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, fourth caliph of Islam and a sacred figure in Shi’ism. It also has the most important Shiite religious school (hawza), on par with the one in the Iranian city of Qom, making it an important place of pilgrimage for Iraqi Shiites and Shiites from the Gulf and Iran. “Through this commitment, Riyadh seeks to (...) elevate the religious importance of Najaf to that of the Iranian city of Qom,” a May 2018 report by the International Crisis Group stated.
The easiest task
Tehran is likely upset with Saudi Arabia’s recent advance into Shiite territory in Iraq. The Islamic Republic was hoping to increase its power in Najaf by influencing the choice of Ayatollah Sistani’s successor. Iraq plays an important role in Iran’s regional strategy and is an important and much needed trading partner, especially as Iran’s economy suffers under the weight of US sanctions.
“Iran has made it clear that it's willing to fight in every way to preserve its undue influence in Iraq. So its responses will be redoubled efforts politically and diplomatically to fend off Saudi influence in the country. But as long as there is no military dimension to the battle, that tends to favor Saudi Arabia,” Hussein Ibish, a Gulf specialist at the Gulf Arab States Institute in Washington, told OLJ. “In other words, Saudi Arabia has the easier job, whereas Iran has to defend an outside influence that would be hard for any country to maintain, especially given the sanctions and other pressure that Tehran now faces.”
(This article was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour on the 18th of April)
