François Hollande, former President of the French Republic, at his office in Paris. Photo by Benoit Granier.
Former French President François Hollande is visiting Lebanon this week for the fourth time in nearly fifteen years (his first visit having been on 14 March 2005 during the Cedar Revolution) as a “friend of the Lebanese people” with the clear desire to convey a message of “appeasement and unity”. On this occasion, L’Orient-Le Jour conducted a wide-ranging and candid interview with the former president in Paris, before his trip, in which the international and regional political situation was discussed in the light of his experiences with the major issues that marked his mandate and which are now, more than ever, in the news.
What is striking in your book is that we witness throughout your presidency a sort of world disruption, a globalization process coming to an end, a transition to a hybrid state, with the rise of extremism and the return of identitarism and populism. As a former President of the Republic, how do you reconnect with political life in the current context through citizen action that is, strictly speaking, much more than political? This is in addition to learning to be silent, given that the symbolic scope of your statements has now changed, while France is going through a difficult stage characterized by widening inequalities with foreign interference that leads to the rise of extremism, and the country’s European future is at stake.
The world has already changed since I left the Elysee Palace, and it is neither my fault, nor my successor’s fault. Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States has changed the rules of the international game considerably. Before his victory, it was still believed that [existing] international agreements would be maintained. Since then, none of these agreements has held, whether concerning [the] climate or Iran, or even trade agreements. Similarly, we have been witnessing for the past 18 months a rise of powers that have not been thwarted in any way, be it Russia, Turkey or, economically speaking, China. Lastly, Europe – which was not necessarily in a satisfactory position – is now confronted with populism that challenges it, not as an institution, but as a project. Europe will not break up or dilute, but it will no longer advance and will no longer act as a global player. In this context, and with a globalization that has been the victim of both its successes and its failures, nationalisms have regained momentum, as is evidenced everywhere. More serious still, conflicts are settled by force, and we can see this in the Middle East, where the eradication of Daesh was not followed by a process of reconciliation and democratic transition in which the opposition could have been incorporated. We are heading towards Balkanization, an ongoing confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and, consequently, towards continuous destabilization. That is why today, as an observer who can put his experience to good use, I believe that it is very important to return to fundamental principles, i.e. the interest of a multilateral approach, the return of international institutions, particularly the United Nations, the need to find compromises, and the return of law. However, I am fully aware that this will not be enough. It is also necessary to establish a much more assertive European policy, [and] an American policy that ends isolationism, protectionism and unilateralism. It is also necessary for the powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran – to understand that the balance of power can be dangerous when it is pushed to the limit. There comes a moment when you need to get out of the state of war.
Didn’t the Syrian dossier constitute for you a concrete example of a clean slate of international law and the Yalta-based system, with the scale of the massacres and the refugee disaster, as well as foreign interventions without any safeguards, like those of Iran, Russia and Turkey? Do you think you also paid the price for your “double enemy” strategy (Assad and Daesh) insofar as, while maintaining its fundamentals, France’s foreign policy was no longer as clear about your principled position, namely that these two evils needed one another?
The Syrian regime and Daesh played a game together, not because there was any potential rapprochement between them, but because they had at one time the same interests. Indeed, Bashar al-Assad’s regime needed Daesh to obtain from the international community a form of absolution of its faults, including the use of chemical weapons or the crushing of any opposition. On the other hand, Daesh needed a regime that provoked condemnation to justify jihadism around the world. Faced with this game, the [international] powers were unable to assert international law. The UN Security Council was paralyzed by repeated Russian vetoes, including on the issue of chemical weapons; the Geneva process for reconciliation and transition failed; the international coalition had to use a Kurdish and Arab force inside Syria to fight against Daesh, while Russian aviation helped the regime crush the opposition in Aleppo and elsewhere.
In the same vein, the Gulf countries were less and less supportive of the rebellion, while Iran was much more forthright in its intervention. If we want to look at the consequences of what has happened to Syria, we must ask ourselves if we will achieve peace. We will no doubt succeed in stopping the bombardments and military movements, but the very causes of the conflict remain. The regime has not changed and radical Islamism continues to flourish. Are we sure that Daesh will not resurface in another form? However, even beyond Syria, the international community seems unable to resolve conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whose outcome no one can see, the open conflict around Ukraine, which is related to the inaction on Syria, or Yemen. It is important in this context to strengthen global values and multilateralism. The powers need to realize that their game could prove to be particularly dangerous at times, including for their own interests, and the United States needs to understand that by withdrawing – which is the hallmark of isolationism-, their stance will help exacerbate threats instead of repelling them.
Didn’t this isolationism begin with Barack Obama, and didn’t you experience it yourself during the Ghouta chemical attack in August 2013?
Yes, to a certain extent. I also think it will continue with whoever succeeds Donald Trump one day. Since the United States no longer wants to be the world’s policeman, this places a responsibility on us as Europeans and French. It is even more important that Europe reinforces itself on the political and defense fronts and that France plays a diplomatic and political role that is commensurate with the support Europe can offer it.
Aren’t you afraid that this will be jeopardized by an increasingly significant Russian influence, not only on European politics in general, with the emergence today of a bloc of Eastern countries that are responsive to populist and identity rhetoric, but also on France, given Moscow's relations with the extreme right and extreme left?
Nationalists – for this is how populists should be dubbed – are [today] of another nature than their distant forefathers. They do not support conquest or influence, or whatever outside intervention. All nationalists support closure, in the sense of forgetting the world. This is what brings them together – they do not want to feel passionate about anything other than their own national interests. They have no interest in the European cause, they are indifferent to the global issue, and they want to stop there. It is nationalism that does not want the nation to be anything else other than a space of confinement, whereas the concept of nation in itself is not conservative, but quite the opposite. Born from the French Revolution, the nation has the vocation to have a universal reach. There is nationalism that can be built on territorial conquests, but the nation aims to ensure that the world can be enriched by exchanges, pluralism and living together. Vladimir Putin is glad that these nationalists want to have no enemy other than other countries, the world, Europe, the UN... because this allows him to move forward.
You were one of the main architects of the Iran nuclear deal in July 2015, the contribution of Laurent Fabius having been decisive in this regard. Are you worried about this deal today? How do you evaluate it? Was it exploited by Revolutionary Guards for expansionist purposes in the Middle East?
Did they really want this deal to take place? Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was the main negotiator on the Iranian side, submitted his resignation a few days ago before reversing it... Those who wanted this agreement in Iran wanted to open their country so it can once again be a major economic pole. This was the challenge – to move towards growth and consumption and thus reenter the world. Donald Trump made a dangerous choice since he let the conservatives play [the] victim and exacerbate the nationalist sentiment while complicating the lives of millions of Iranians who cannot access the exchange to the extent possible. We must do everything we can to preserve the scope of the agreement, i.e. compliance with it first, to prevent Iran from having access to nuclear weapons. Further, we have to make it possible for us, the signatories of this deal, with the exception of the United States, to continue to trade and invest in Iran. We need to keep in mind that any constraints or burdens ultimately play into the hands of conservatives.
This is your fourth visit to Lebanon. What message do you wish to send to the Lebanese, who have waited two and a half years for a President of the Republic to be elected, nine years to elect a new Parliament and nine months for a government to be formed, and who are now waiting for the implementation of the reforms planned by the Paris Conference (CEDRE) in a challenging economic and financial context?
Firstly, I come to deliver a message of friendship to the Lebanese people, who are irrevocably linked to the French people. It is also a message of solidarity, because of the burden Lebanon has endured with the influx of Syrian refugees (nearly a million and a half [people]). We know it is very difficult for them to return to Syria today and find their villages destroyed and a regime that might punish them in one way or another, while the whole process should now consist of encouraging their return home. I also come to say how essential Lebanese unity is. We know how many times Lebanon has been on the tightrope next to Syria, a country that was being torn apart. Lebanon has stood its ground, and we should pay tribute to all the actors who avoided deterioration, in spite of the elapsed time, the delayed elections, and the newly-formed government. Civil peace has nonetheless been preserved and the terrorist threat removed. That is why I am very attached to Lebanon – it is a perfect example that it is possible to come together after rifts, while avoiding naivety on the conditions of civil peace. However, nothing beats peace when one has been so affected by war. I know that Lebanon remains economically fragile, hence the importance of sending a message about the country’s attractiveness. It is also fragile because there are many conflicts that are not settled at its borders and fragile internally since the government comprises many sensitivities. In these moments, it is important for any presence, including mine, to be a factor of appeasement and unity.
Regarding the sovereignty of Lebanon, do you have any concerns, with the Assad regime remaining in place and the influence of Hezbollah, on the decision making process?
We know what consequences the Syrian regime [has] had for on Lebanon. When faced with such a neighbor that has not changed its intentions, it is better to keep your distance as much as possible. As for Hezbollah, it is a Lebanese component. We cannot both want unity and politically remove one of its components. The essential question remains that of its disarmament, and the Lebanese Army is an element of national unity. That is why I did everything to help the Lebanese Army have the necessary equipment when I was President of the Republic.
(This interview was originally published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour on the 5th of March)
